Introduction.
It has frequently been suggested that firms in the large industrial groupings of Japan and Korea, known respectively as keiretsu and chaebol, may behave differently than their US or European counterparts in a number of dimensions. A small set of papers in recent years have examined whether membership in such groupings affects firms' foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions, particularly the effect of keiretsu groupings on Japanese FDI activity (cites?).
The majority of papers on this topic have examined the effect of vertical keiretsu groupings, where upstream suppliers are centered around a large downstream manufacturer. As detailed in Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) , significant agglomeration externalities are likely present for firms in vertical keiretsu groupings. Suppliers work closely with downstream firms on designing specialized components and often provide just-in-time delivery of supplies. Thus, geographic proximity enhances the efficiency of such arrangements, giving firms incentives to locate their FDI in the same region. Head, Ries and Swenson (HRS) empirically examine Japanese FDI in the U.S. and find that a greater existing stock of a Japanese firm's own vertical keiretsu members in a particular U.S. state makes that firm more likely to locate in that state as well. However, they find that this vertical keiretsu effect is largely due to the automobile sector, and is no longer present when observations from this sector are excluded from their sample. 1 The other major form of industrial grouping in Japan is the horizontal keiretsu; these are groupings of firms in often-unrelated industries that are centered on a large bank. There are three features of horizontal keiretsu that observers have pointed out may be important for economic behavior: 1) cross-ownership across member firms; the group-bank holds a significant share of the group-member firms equity, and these member firms hold substantial equity positions in each other. 2) Potentially easier terms of credit for members from the keiretsuaffiliated bank; both due to a reduction in the costs of monitoring, and the discipline of repeat financing. 3) Organized meetings amongst major keiretsu firms often called Presidential Council meetings; these potentially facilitate the exchange of information and the coordination of actions.
With respect to FDI activity, researchers have focused on easier credit terms as the feature of horizontal keiretsu that potentially leads to greater firm investment. The tests employed examine whether membership in any horizontal keiretsu increases a firm's likelihood of FDI, since such membership should give the firm cheaper financing of investment, ceteris paribus.
2 The evidence for these effects of horizontal keiretsu membership is much more mixed than for vertical keiretsu.
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In addition, a recent paper by Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) argues that the features of horizontal keiretsu described above are more myth than reality. They point out that the vast majority of financing by Japanese firms in keiretsu groupings comes from non-keiretsu financial institutions, and this share has been increasing over time. This runs counter to the notion that horizontal keiretsu firms rely on their keiretsu bank for easier credit terms and may explain why previous studies have only found mixed evidence that horizontal keiretsu membership increases (foreign) investment. Likewise, Miwa and Ramseyer show that cross-shareholding arrangements are much lower than one would expect, particularly between the non-financial members of these positive effects of vertical keiretsu groupings on Japanese FDI activity using alternative estimation strategies, including Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996) , Yui and Pugel (1995), and Ryan (2001) . 2 A horizontal keiretsu membership dummy is also sometimes interacted with variables that measure how creditconstrained the firm may be, to see if membership is more beneficial for such firms in the keiretsu. 3 Belderbos and Sleuwegen (1996) find that horizontal keiretsu membership makes Japanese firms more likely to be multinational enterprises and that this membership effect is most significant for those firms that are credit constrained. Ryan (2001) 5 We find these papers compelling, and suggest they serve to answer the obvious response to Miwa and Ramseyer's (2002) criticism, which is to ask why such meetings take place if they serve no purpose.
In this paper, we examine for the first time the potential effect of networking connections through keiretsu relationships on the FDI decisions made by Japanese firms. We hypothesize that if network effects are present then previous FDI activity by a firm's horizontal keiretsu partners into particular foreign regions will make FDI into the same regions by the firm more likely because this lowers the necessary costs of information acquisition. Thus, our focus is on whether region-specific horizontal keiretsu activity affects a firm's FDI location decisions. This 4 Note that tacit collusive decisions are by their very nature difficult to observe. Thus, it should not surprise us if there are few known examples of obvious lunch club decisions that had an impact. 5 Such papers include Greif (1993) , Gould (1994) , Head and Ries (1998) , Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Trinidade (2002) . Rauch (2001) provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical work in this area.
contrasts with previous studies of FDI by horizontal keiretsu that has examined whether keiretsu membership per se affects a firm's decision to engage in FDI at all.
Similar to HRS, we estimate a Japanese firm's FDI location decision using a conditional logit framework. However, we introduce two important innovations; first, we sample FDI location decisions by Japanese manufacturing firms in the late 1980s and early 1990s across all foreign regions of the world, second, our sample includes both vertical and horizontal keiretsu, this allows us to examine the potential networking effects of horizontal keiretsu, while controlling for agglomeration benefits that are a strong feature of vertical keiretsu linkages.
[Section summarizing main empirical results and conclusions of paper]
Empirical Methodology
We follow HRS in specifying a Japanese firm's FDI location decision as one that can be modeled using a conditional logit specification. Assuming production is Cobb-Douglas and that agglomeration externalities enter the production function in a multiplicative fashion similar to infrastructure and other inputs, a firm's profitability for producing in a particular region is a loglinear function of the agglomeration measures, infrastructure measures and factor prices. Thus, the profitability of region r for investor j may be represented as
where A i represents agglomeration externalities from source i, θ r represents region-specific effects, and ε j,r is an error term. Region-specific effects are important as they control for a wide variety of potentially important characteristics of a region that are both difficult to measure very precisely and hard to observe, but none-the-less may make it more or less attractive to investors.
Such characteristics range from infrastructure and input prices to labor force characteristics and amenities of the natural environment. The effect of these region-specific features on location decisions should not vary across investors. However, it is impossible to obtain comparable data on such activity across regions of the world for detailed 4-digit SIC industries. Since our data span just seven years, we assume that changes in such aggregate activity remain constant across regions and are then subsumed into the region effects. Examination of the fourth source of agglomeration externalities (effects from border states) is not a significant issue for our analysis because we examines Japanese investment into much more aggregate country/region groupings than HRS. Thus, we do not include such measures in our analysis.
Unlike HRS, our analysis examines not only agglomeration effects from vertical keiretsu relationships, but also the potential for networking effects due to horizontal keiretsu connections.
We hypothesize that networking connections with firms in a particular region provide important investment information to an investing firm that can lower its costs of production in that particular region. For example, such information could allow the firm to better site its investment in a more cost-effective location and/or garner more favorable tax and regulatory treatment.
Another source of cost-reducing information not explored by HRS is the firm's own experience. Shaver, Mitchell, and Yeung (1997) find that FDI by firms into a region for which they have prior FDI experience is more likely to survive than FDI by first-time entrants. 7 They attribute these effects to informational spillovers that occur within the firm. Such within-firm informational spillovers should reduce the cost of operation in regions where a firm has prior experience and make such a location more attractive than other regions, ceteris paribus.
Given these considerations, we can modify equation (1) to include these two sources of information spillovers, horizontal keiretsu groupings and the firm's own experience:
where HK is a variable capturing the potential for information sharing through horizontal keiretsu relationships with other firms in region r, and PE is a variable measuring the firm's own previous experience in region r, which can provide evidence on intra-firm information sharing.
One potential difference between agglomeration effects from vertical keiretsu relationships and networking information effects from horizontal keiretsu groupings is that while agglomeration effects clearly relate to stocks of related firms, information effects may be more directly tied to recent flows of investment into a region, not stocks. Firms that have most recently invested in a region should have better current information for potential investors. As a result, we will examine both stock and recent flow measures of agglomeration and informationsharing variables in our empirical analyses. Our maintained hypothesis is thus that stock measures best capture agglomeration effects, and flow measures best capture informationsharing effects.
Of course, there may be agglomeration externalities that stem from what we are terming information variables. There may be agglomeration externalities between horizontal keiretsu firms, even though these horizontal keiretsu firms are often in different industries and, likewise, agglomeration externalities may stem from a firm's own previously-established plants in a region. However, we expect agglomeration effects from these sources to relatively minimal and outweighed by the informational effects. Similarly, some information effects may stem from what we are terming agglomeration variables. As our analysis below will show, these effects sort out well when comparing flow versus stock measures of our agglomeration and information variables.
Data and Variable Construction
We use the publication, Japanese To proxy for agglomeration effects, HRS uses counts of establishments/plants. One concern with counts is that it assumes comparable size of such establishment/plants. As Table 1 shows, average plant size in terms of employees can be quite different even at the aggregate country level, with a low of 187.4 employees per affiliate in Singapore to a high of 434.5 employees per affiliate in Germany. Given that the size of the affiliate likely affects the expected agglomeration and information effects from such an affiliate, we use the number of 8 We gratefully thank Keith Head and John Ries at the University of British Columbia for sharing their electronic version of these data. 9 Over half of the total Japanese affiliates reported in Toyo Kezei (1993) HRS measure agglomeration variables as stocks, adding up the number of affiliates from all previous years. As mentioned above, this seems most appropriate for agglomeration variables, but is perhaps less appropriate for information variables, as the quality of information may depend on recent experiences. Thus, we consider measures that include only the previousyear activity (flows) and ones that measure the stock of activity, 10 expecting that the evidence for the information variables is stronger when considering flow measures and vice versa for the agglomeration variables.
One measurement problem we face, regardless of whether one uses counts of establishments or employees is that we have these counts as of 1991-92 only, the year of the survey. Thus, when we include observations prior to these years, we are assuming no exits between those years and the end of the sample and constant employee levels. Head and Ries (2002) made the same assumptions in using this database to examine skill upgrading by Japanese firms when investing abroad. Having our sample consider FDI activity only as far back as 1985 mitigates this problem to some extent, especially when using previous-year flow data for our regressors. In fact, we get qualitatively similar coefficient estimates to those reported below when we restrict our sample to just the two most recent years of our sample, 1990 and 1991, though the loss of observations inflates standard errors somewhat. The use of stock data for our measures is more problematic as it necessarily assumes no exit or changes in employee levels for Japanese manufacturing affiliates has ever taken place. Of course, the vast majority of Japanese FDI occurred in the 1980s and 1990s (over 50% during the years of our sample, 1985-1991) which helps in making the 1992 numbers a reasonable approximation for most of the sample.
With stock variables, counts of establishments may have an advantage in that exits of Japanese affiliates are a rare event, while changes in employee levels may be more common. Our results with stock variables are robust to whether one uses counts of establishments or number of employee measures. Employee measures, however, always outperform counts-of-establishment measures in terms of the attained log likelihood and goodness of fit measures. Thus, our specifications below use employee measures.
We use Industrial Groupings in Japan 1988/89, published by Dodwell Marketing
Consultants to categorize Japanese firms into keiretsu groupings. For horizontal keiretsu groupings, the publication also lists which firms are "Presidential Council" or "lunch club"
members. This will allow us to examine in our analysis below whether the horizontal keiretsu effects on investment are larger for these firms, as one would expect if the networking information hypothesis is correct.
Results
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 present our conditional logit maximum likelihood estimates of Japanese manufacturing FDI when we use the previous year's investment flow and total FDI stock, respectively, to measure our agglomeration and information variables. The first two rows report coefficient estimates for the agglomeration measures, previous investment by vertical keiretsu members and previous investment by Japanese firms in the same industry. The second two rows report coefficient estimates for the networking/information variables, previous investment by horizontal keiretsu members and previous investment by the firm. Region dummies are included in both equations and a chi-squared test strongly supports their inclusion.
Comparing the specification with one-year flow measures (column1) versus stock measures (column 2) provide differences in coefficients as hypothesized. The strongest evidence for the information variables are in the one-year flow specification, while the agglomeration variables are strongest when stock data are used. The previous-year flow of investment by horizontal keiretsu members affects current year location decisions in a statistically significant manner, providing the strongest evidence to date that networking effects influence FDI behavior, not just trading patterns. As one would expect, the effect of the firm's own recent investment experience is even stronger, with a coefficient that is roughly double the magnitude of the horizontal keiretsu effect. In the stock specification in column 2, the coefficient on both of these variables falls and the effect of horizontal keiretsu investment stock is not statistically significant.
The results for the agglomeration variables are symmetrically opposite. Both variables come in strongly when measured in stocks, as in HRS. Also consistent with HRS, we find that the agglomeration effect from vertical keiretsu member investment is stronger than the agglomeration effect from investment by other Japanese firms in the same industry. In this way, our results generalize HRS's conclusions about the effect of agglomeration effects on Japanese FDI location to a sample that considers Japanese FDI to all world locations, not just regions in the United States.
While we can tell from the coefficient estimates that the marginal effects of the information variables are in the same range as the agglomeration variables, it is not straightforward to interpret the magnitude of coefficient estimates in a conditional logit model.
However, as shown in HRS, it can be shown that the average probability elasticity (over all choosers and location choices) for a given regressor can be expressed as the ratio, S-1/S, multiplied by the regressor's associated coefficient, where S is the number of location choices.
Since there are eleven location choices in our specification, the elasticity of the probability of a location being chosen with respect to a regressor is the regressor's associated coefficient multiplied by 0.91. At first glance this makes the elasticities associated with the coefficient estimates seem quite small, and, indeed, they are significantly smaller than those reported by HRS. However, our use of employment data rather than counts of affiliates means that our regressors have significant variation as seen in Table 2 . For example, a standard deviation increase in the horizontal keiretsu investment regressor (using one-year flow data) represents an increase of 256% of the sample's mean value of this regressor. In fact, for all but one regressor (investment stock of other firms in the industry) the standard deviation is at least 100% of the mean. This suggests that thinking about the marginal effects for a doubling (100%) increase in a variable is a reasonable metric for evaluating the economic significance of these variables on Japanese manufacturing location decisions. By this metric, the estimated coefficients suggest small, though not inconsequential impacts. For example, a doubling of previous-year investment by horizontal keiretsu members in an average region increases the probability of FDI location there by 3.1%. Similarly, there is a 6.9% increase in location probability for a doubling of previous-year investment in the region by the firm itself. One potential reason for fairly small elasticities is that there are a large number of observations with little or no previous investment and a smaller number of observations where investment is relatively large. Thus, interpreting estimated elasticities as relating to a regressor distribution that is relatively continuous may be
misleading.
An alternative is to specify our regressors in a more dichotomous fashion. Another
reason to explore such a specification is that agglomeration or information effects may be relatively miniscule unless there is some minimum level of investment. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 we specify our agglomeration and information variables as binary variables that take the value of "1" if the previous investment (flow or stock) in a regions was greater than a certain threshold and "0" if not. For previous-year flow measures in column 3, the threshold we use is 100 employees, whereas for investment stock measures in column 4, the threshold is 500 employees. (Comment: Thresholds need some justification) The patterns of coefficient signs and significance in columns 3 and 4 are almost identical to those in columns 1 and 2. Thus, our results are robust to this alternative specification.
However, the marginal effects are more easily interpretable in this binary specification of our variables, as the change in the probability of location in a region when the threshold investment level occurs. For example, if the previous-year investment flow into a particular region by a firm's horizontal keiretsu members was greater than 100 employees, the probability of location in that region by the firm goes up 19.2%. Previous-year investment by the firm itself greater than 100 employees raises the location probability 43.5%. The relative magnitudes of the marginal effects that come out of this specification show that both the networking/information and agglomeration effects are economically quite significant.
[Discussion of Table 4 will go here, showing that network effects are largest for Presidential council firms in the most cohesive horizontal groupings AND that our results are robust to including region-year dummies.]
Conclusion
[ To be written ] 
